| In the early
1960s, Malaya sought to bring together Singapore, and the Borneo
states of Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei and itself under the Federation
of Malaysia, an idea fully supported by Britain. The Indonesian
President Sukarno, however, vehemently opposed the move as it
threatened his own designs on the rest of Borneo. The first sign
of trouble came in 1962 in the Sultanate of Brunei, when a small
Indonesian backed, anti-Malaysian element rebelled. The British
forces, however, quickly ended this revolt. By early 1963, the
situation had worsened, with well-trained Indonesian insurgents
infiltrating over the border from the Kalimantan regions. In
response, Britain raised a force of Malaysian, Commonwealth, and
British Troops, including the SAS, to deal with the situation.
Unfortunately the force was only a small one and the border
stretched for 1,120km (700miles) trough thick jungle. Not only
did they face a threat from the Indonesians, but also for the
internal terrorist element, the Clandestine Communist
Organization or CCO, who were made up mainly of Chinese settlers
from Sarawak. |
| SAS
Dedication |

The British Commander in Borneo, Major-General Walter Walker,
initially wanted the SAS to parachute into the jungle, as they
had in Malaya, and recapture helicopter landing areas that had
fallen into rebel hands. The commander of 22 SAS at the time,
Lieutenant-Colonel John Woodhouse, remembering the high casualty
rate of tree-jumping, persuaded walker that the SAS would be
better suited to patrolling the
border instead. A Squadron consisted of only 70 men, a small
number to patrol such a long stretch of border, especially in
such hostile jungle conditions. However, by operating in 21
patrols of two or three men, and staying in the jungle for long
periods of time, they were able to provide early warning of any
Indonesian military or Communist incursions. As well as
patrolling the border, the SAS took on another very important
task - that of winning the 'hearts and minds' of the native
people. By gaining an understanding of their lifestyle and
language, by living with them and dispensing medical aid when
needed, the SAS gained important allies in intelligence
gathering. The local people, who still crossed the border freely
into Kalimantan to trade their goods, often brought back
valuable information on Indonesian troop movements.
The SAS also recruited some of the local people as border
scouts. Their role was primarily of gathering intelligence as
they proved to be unsuited in conventional combat roles. Another
group recruited and trained by the SAS from 1964 onwards,
however, was known as the Cross-Border Scouts and they took part
in raids across the border into Kalimantan. So, when the
Indonesian incursion started in earnest in 1963, A Squadron were
already prepared to repel them. They knew the best amsuh and
helicopter LZs, and the 'hearts and minds' campaign was working
well. By 1964, attacks by the Indonesian military were becoming
more frequent, and Walker authorized the first top secret
'Claret' raids across the border into Kalimantan. B Squadron SAS
reformed in January 1964 (G Squadron would be formed in 1966
from guardsmen who had been undertaking SAS-type patrols with
the Guards Independent Parachute Company on the central Sarawak
border) and, together with A Squadron, conducted a number of
'Claret' missions. During late 19 patrols from B Squadron were
concentrated in the Pueh range of hills of western Sarawak, a
favourite route for CCO agents making their way into Lundu where
a number of Communist cells were located. After a short break, D
Squadron returned in May 1965, commanded by Major Peter de la
Billière. He continued the cross border raids with the aid of
the Ghurkhas, but the enemy often proved elusive. The patrols
established likely ambush sites and potential Helicopter LZs.
They made notes of all the likely places the Indonesians would
try to infiltrate, and chartered a previously unexplored region
known as 'The Gap'. All intelligence collected was relayed back
to SAS HQ on HF radios. In August working closely with the
Ghurkhas, the SAS launched a series of cross-border raids which
met with varying success. The search for an elusive foe often
ended in frustration; in September 1965, fro example, twelve
four man patrols from A Squadron conducted a three week search
for a CCO camp in the area between the headwaters of the
Sempayang and Bembam rivers, but nothing was found.
SAS
activity, which continued until 1966 did, however convince the
Indonesians that Britain would continue to support Malaysia. The
Indonesian military leadership began to lose faith in their
president, and, in march, Sukumo was overthrown in a coup. Five
months later, Indonesia made peace with Malaysia.
The campaign in Borneo is an outstanding example of the
tenacity, resourcefulness and skill of the individual SAS
soldier, and illustrates that a small number of well-trained and
motivated men can achieve results out of all proportion to their
numbers. Walker himself stated. 'I regard seventy troopers of
the SAS as being as valuable to me as 700 infantry in the role
of 'hearts and minds', border surveillance, early warning, stay
behind, eyes and ears with a string.' |
'We were very good at our job.' -
Jock Thompson.
'It was a hell of a challenge, that's why we did it' - Lofty
Large |
|